INTRODl 7 CTION
This article establishes that, under certain conditions, individuals are encouraged to com mit crimes by a belief that the criminal justice system may act against them whether or not they commit crimes. Thus, protection of the in nocent from police harassment may itself deter crime, and harassment of the innocent by the criminal justice system may encourage crime. The latter result is used to hypothesize a partial explanation of the ethnic demographics of the U.S. prison population that is superior to the conventional argument that cnminals are invet erate risk takers. This explanation is generalizable to cases where members of a particular so cial group perceive themselves to be unfairly treated by law enforcement agents.
The criminal justice system is considered to help control crime because the likelihood of be ing apprehended and punished deters persons from committing crimes. Additionally, by the apprehension, conviction, and punishment of persons who have committed crimes, the sys tem incapacitates and, with any luck, rehabili tates criminals. Only deterrence, and not inca pacitation or rehabilitation, is examined in this article.
One side effect of the criminal justice system is the potential for harassment, apprehension, and punishment of persons who have not com mitted crimes, or at least have not committed the crimes for which they are being investi gated, apprehended, or charged. A simple ratio nal actor model, an extension of the traditional economic model of Becker ( 1968 Becker ( , 1995 , estab lishes the following result: For the majority of individuals, a belief that the likelihood of ha rassment is not reasonably lower than the likeli hood of proper punishment encourages the commission of crimes.
DECISION ANALYSIS A.l '-l"D ATTITUDE TOWARD RISK
The analysis presented here is an extension and refinement of the rational actor model em ployed in the economic and game-theoretic analyses of the decision to commit a crime. The present analysis extends these analyses of crime by including a more contemporary treatment of attitude toward risk and the costs imposed on nonparticipants in crime by the criminal justice system. 1 The rational actor model characterizes ratio nal behavior as svstematic behavior £0\·emed bv . � -the optimization of expected utility, itself determined by an individual's evaluation of the pay offs and the likelihoods of the payoffs. and the individual" s attitude toward risk. (On the ratio nal actor model see Bernoulli. 1738; von Neu m,mn. and Morgenstern, 1947; Savage. 1954; Fishburn. 1970: and Jeffrey 1983 . On attitude toward risk see Bernoulli, 1738; Pratt. 1964; and Arrow. 1965 .) The modem account of the rational actor model has been greatly informed by careful observations of revealed risk atti tudes (Fishburn. 1977; Fishburn and Kochen berger. 1979; Battalio. Kagel, and MacDonald, 1985; Battalio, Kagel. and Jiranyakul, 1990.) 2 The present analysis employs the modem ac count of the rational actor model to provide a refined and extended version of the traditional economic analysis of crime (Becker, 1968 (Becker, , 1995 . The discussion presented here is kept consistent with the traditional analysis for two reasons. First, the traditional analysis serves as the foun dation for much of the work in the law and eco nomics literature. Second, the results of the traditional analysis provide a justification for the contemporary get-tough-on-crime policies of the federal and various state and local govern ments in the United States.
The treatment of attitude toward risk is the fundamental refinement of the traditional analy sis adopted here. There are three relevant atti tudes toward risk: (1) an individual is risk averse if, and only if, the individual's utility function is increasing at a decreasing rate; (2) an individual is risk preferring if, and only if, the individual's utility function is increasing at an increasing rate; and (3) an individual is risk averse/risk preferring if, and only if, the indi vidual is risk averse over gains and risk prefer ring over losses. Risk aversion is generally viewed as the essence of middle-class normalcy, while risk preference is viewed as an abnormality.
Risk aversion and risk preferring behavior are regularly seen together, and various at tempts have been made to explain their joint ap pearance (Battalio, Kagel. and Jiranyakul, 1990: Battalio, Kagel, and MacDonald, 1985; Cam erer, 1989; Fishburn, 1977: Fishburn and Kochen berger, 1979; Friedman and Savage, 1948) . Ob servations of revealed attitude toward risk show that the majority of individuals are risk averse/ risk preferring; that the utility valuation of no change in wealth is zero; and that the utility function is more steeply sloped over losses than over gains (Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul. 1990; Battalio, Kagel, and MacDonald, 1985; Fishburn and Kochenberger. 1979) .
The modern work on risk also shows that wealth serves as a parameter in the utility func tion, and that the utility function can be viewed as a two-dimensional cross-section of a three dimensional surface. For example, a two-piece von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that exhibits constant absolute risk aversion and constant absolute risk preference is of the gen eral form:
where A and a are slope parameters, B is the de gree of risk version/risk preference, 6.w is change in wealth, a > A > 0, and B > 0.
This function is an S-shaped utility function and is displayed in Figure 1 . The related von Neumann-Morgenstern util ity surface, as a function of change in wealth, -6.w, and wealth, w, is of the general form:
Th.is surface is displayed in Figure 2 . Note the ef fect of increasing wealth in Figure 2 -the S-shaped utility function, which is a cross-section of the surface, flattens as wealth increases.
THE CRIME DECISION PROBLEM
The crime decision problem consists of the choice between engaging in a particular crimi nal act and not engaging in the act. The decision is made on the basis of the individual's percep tion of the particular crime and the existing criminal justice system at the time of the deci sion. The decision maker believes that the crime will �ield a gain. If caught and punished, the de cision maker believes there will be a loss, greater than the gain, imposed by the criminal justice system. The individual assesses the probability, given that the crime is committed, of being punished. The decision not to commit the crime does not carry any gain, but may have some costs imposed by the criminal justice sys tem. For example, an innocent person may be stopped for investigation, detained, arrested, and perhaps even convicted. The cost thus borne is called the harassment cost. The indi vidual assesses the size and the probability of incurring the harassment costs. 3 In a society with diYided legislative, judicial, and executive powers. the value of the fine is primarily set by the decision maker's perception of the law as set down in statutes and by the courts. The val ues of the harassment cost and the probabilities of being punished and being harassed are pri marily set by the decision maker" s perception of lav.· enforcement policies and practices. -- mitting and not committing the crime-by ap plying the utility function to the possible out comes of the acts, assigning probabilities to the possible states of affairs, and determining the probability weighted utility, called the expected utility, of each act. The act with the greater ex pected utility is the preferred act. To avoid trivi alities, the present analysis is based on the three-part assumption that the gain is positive. the fine is greater than the gain, and the gain less the fine is more negative than the harass ment cost. The first two assumptions avoid situ ations where crime does not pay and where crime always pays: the last is merely the as sumption that the criminal justice system is suf ficiently accurate to impose. on average, greater costs on criminals who get caught in its web than on noncriminals. The analysis begins with the presumption that the police are more likely to properly intercept the guilty than to improp erly intercept the innocent. 5
The crime decision problem is presented in Table 1 . The parameters are as follows-g is the gain from the crime. f is the fine, c is the harassment cost. p is the probability of rightful punishment, and q is the probability of wrongful 
harassment. As noted, to avoid trivialities it is as sumed thatf > g > 0, g-f < -c, and p > q.
6
The expected utility of committing the crime is:
and the expected utility of not committing the crime is
where EU is the individual's expected utility function and U(O) = 0. The individual prefers committing the crime to not committing the crime if. and only if:
For an individual deterred from crime, the difference between EU(no crime) and EU(crime) is positive. The difference. denoted by D, is: 
THE PlJN1SHMENT-DETERRENCE TRADEOFF
The analysis presented here addresses one basic question-does a strategy for increasing the punishment of the guilty, f, increase deter rence if it has the side effect of increasing the level of harassment. c, imposed on those inno cently caught up in the criminal justice system? The answer to this question depends upon the individual's attitude toward risk. The answer is positive for risk averse and risk neutral persons. and positive for risk averse/risk preferring per sons as long as the probability of punishment, p. is reasonably larger than the probability of ha rassment, q. The answer. however, is negative --for risk averse/risk preferring persons if q is close top.
The derivation of this result is straightfor ward. The response of D to small and equal in creases inf and c is given by the total differen tial of D, dD. where 
is increasing at a decreasing rate. For a risk neu 
then dD is positive, and the answer to the ques tion is positive. Contrariwise. if q is close to p , that is, if
then dD is negative, and the answer to the ques tion is negative. 7 The foregoing results warrant the following claims. A policy of increasingly severe punish ment of both the guilty and the innocent should be a successful deterrent for those individuals,. regardless of their attitudes toward risk, who · perceive the likelihood of punishment to be rea sonably greater than the likelihood of harass ment. Such a policy, however, will not be a suc cessful deterrent for individuals who are risk preferring or risk averse/risk preferring if they perceive that the likelihood of harassment is close to or greater than the likelihood of punish-ment. Note that the deterrent effect of increasingly severe punishment and harassment depends upon both the decision maker's attitude coward risk and his or her perception of the likelihoods of punishment and harassment. Finally, note that the foregoing analysis concerns only the individual's movement toward committing the crime. The individual chooses to commit the crime if and only if D < 0, that is, if and only if.
the right-hand side of this inequality does nm:
have a unique relationship co unity. Therefore. q need not exceed p in order for committing the crime to be the preferred act.
RISK A TTITL'DE. HARASSMENT, AND U.S . PRISON DEMOGRAPHICS
The policy implications of the foregoing analysis are straightforward. iuiy policy that increases the severity of both the punishment of the guilty and the harassment of the innocent. such as a war on crime. may tend to induce criminal behavior among those who are risk averse/risk preferring and perceive similar likelihoods of being rightfully punished or wrongfully harassed. The traditional economic analysis of crime explains criminal activity by ' positing that most criminals are inveterate risk takes, that is. habirually risk preferring over both loses and gains. 8 This explanation, although consistent with the analysis presented here , has two glaring weaknesses. First, risk preference over gains is rare (Fishburn and Kochenberger. 1979 ) and criminal activity is not. Second. because a disproportionate number of criminals in the U.S . prison system come fro~ minority groups. the traditional explanation requires the presumption that dispropor---tionately many members of minorities are risk preferring over gains. (See, generally, Horney and Marshall, 1992; Katz, 1991; Keane, Gilli, and Hagan, 1989; Rand, 1992; Sherman, 1990 ; U .S. Department of Justice, 1991; Williams and Hawkins, 1986; Yu and Liska, 1993; Zimring and Hawkins, 1973 .)
The analysis advanced here presents the theoretical basis for a possibly superior (partial) explanation of the demographics of the American prison population. The explanation proffered here makes two simple presumptions. First, it is presumed that minority populations have the same distribution of attirudes toward risk as the general population. Second, it is presumed that many minority individuals see themselves as regular recipients of harassment, and thereby perceive the probability of harassment as close to, or even greater than. the probability of rightful punishment. 9 This perception, and not some odd concentration of a rare attitude toward risk. explains some. but not all, of the disproportionate number of African American, Native American, and Latino prisoners in the U.S. penal system. ~ore that a claim is not made here that the foregoing argument explains the whole of U.S. prison demographics. The literarure on the causes of crime offers many potential causes, including poverty, opporcunity. and risk preference. Members of minorities are disproportionately well represented among the poor, and they may have greater opporcunities for crime. It is not likely, however, that they disproportionately possess a rare attitude toward risk. The foregoing argument, based only on the presumption that minority individuals perceive a probability of harassment that is close to the probability of punishment, thus provides a superior explanation of some of the disproportionate minority representation in the U.S. prison system.
ASPECTS OF FAIR.J.'iESS IN CRilvIIN AL JUSTICE
In an ideal society both q and c would be very close to zero. In such a society, a law abiding citizen would have a very low likelihood of contact with the police or the legal system, and any contact that did occur would be at most a minor inconvenience. This property of an ideal society is one of the many facets of the notion of fairness. The notion of fairness employed in the present article has a muc:1 more limited scope and focuses on the implementation of the proce dures. rules, and laws of the legal system. In this view, the legal system is fair to an individ ual facing the crime decision problem only if the probability of punishment, p, is reasonabiy larger than the probability of harassment, q, and the harassment cost. c. is close to zero. The le gal system is unfair if q is dose top, or c is rea sonably larger than zero. or both.
The results deri\·ed above can be restated in terms of the (limited) notion of fairness. If the legal system is unfair in the strong form of the sense employed here (i.e .. if q is close top and c is greater than zeroJ. then the individual moves toward and ultimately chooses the criminal act. Given the general perception that the legal sys tem is unfair, in the sense used here, particularly to African Americans. � ative Americans, and Latinos, it is not surprising that members of these minorities are disproportionately well rep resented in the American penal system.
The notion of fairness as equitable wealth distribution can be accounted for here by con sidering different wealth levels of the decision maker. The effect of wealth on the S-shaped utility function was detailed above-the utility --surface flattens as wealth increases. Thus, those individuals who are treated unfairly with re spect to wealth distribution will have more ec centric utility functions than those who are treated fairly. A formal analysis of this effect is beyond the scope of the present articl�. Note, howeYer. that because an S-shaped utility func tion is more steeply sloped on the loss side, the effect of greater eccentricity is to give greater weight to the risk preferring segment of the util ity function. Thus, in general, unfairness with respect to wealth will lead ro greater levels of criminal activity in the present model. In partic ular, it is easy to show that for an individual fac ing giYen values of the parameters g,f, c, p, and q, it is not possible to have crime preferred to no crime at a high wealth level and no crime pre f erred to crime at a low wealth level.
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The authors thank Matti Joursen. Eric Jensen, Mark Anderson. and three anonymous referees for their com ments and suggestions. NOTES 1. On the economic analysis of rhe crime decision see. panicularly. Becker (1968 . 1995 '1 and. generally, Ehrlich and Becker (1972 , Ehrlich (1973) . Block and Reineke (19751. and Posner (1980) . On rhe game-theoretic analysis see Bueno de Mesquita and Cohen ( 19951. The traditional economic analysis. panicularly Becker ( 1968), considers al tematiYe risk attitudes. but does not consider either the risk averseirisk preferring attitude or harassment. The Bueno de Mesquita-Cohen (1995) analysis assumes that the decision maker is risk neutral. and also does not consider harass ment. The former point is clear from the calculation of the expected utility for a criminal (Bueno de Mesquita and Co hen. 1995:497) . This calculation is linear in payoffs and thereby presumes a linear (i.e .. risk neutral) utility function. The latter point is made by Bueno de Mesquita and Cohen as follows: "To keep our analysis as simple as possible at this stage in our research, we assume that no one is mistak enly arrested and convicted. and we assume that everyone who is apprehended is guilty and conYicted" (Bueno de . Mesquita and Cohen, 1995:497. footnote 8).
2. Parallel work is presented in Kahneman and Tversky (I 979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) . Please note that these studies present and refine Prospect Theory, which is not consistent with the expected utility theory employed in Becker (1968 Becker ( , 1995 , Bueno de Mesquita and Cohen (1995) . and in the present anicle.
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R. DACEY and K. S. GALLANT ( 1993) on the perception of the likelihood of punishment in a study disaggregated by race.
4. The present analysis takes a middle path in defining the costs of involvement with the criminal justice system. and falls between the official criminal sanction ( the sentence only) and all conceivable costs (such as humiliation in the community). The latter are described as informal sanctions in an expanded concept of deterrence in Nagin and Paternoster (1991) . Property forfeiture by the innocent. which has become increasingly common in the United States. is treated by Jensen and Gerber (1996) .
5. There is one interesting case where the two probabilities are approximately equal-when law enforcement-citizen interactions involve random selection of persons for investigation. This would be the case where drunk driving is detected primarily through randomly established roadblocks or tax evasion is discovered primarily by randomly auditing citizens' tax returns. There are a number of cases where the probability of wrongful harassment is close to or greater than the probability of punishment for members of certain groups-when profiles, based on physical or physiological traits related to race and ethnicity, are employed by law enforcement officials to make stops and to detain individuals.
6. Although each of g,J, and c is here viewed as a single value. each is more accurately viewed as the moment of a probability distribution. For example, a prospective criminal does not know the exact value to be gained from a crime. such as the exact amount of money that can be stolen from a bank. As a moment, the gain g is the expected value and c can be considered as independent random variables, and. therefore, the lotteries (i.e., the full expansion of the terms) can be replaced with the moments (Luce and Raiffa, 1967:23-31 
7. An interesting limiting case. raised by a reviewer, arises when the harassment payoff. -c, approaches the loss from crime, g -f Considering just the payoffs, if g -f = -c. then committing the crime dominates not committing the crime. This is so because the payoffs to both acts are equal given that the individual is punished and the payoff to the former is greater than that to the latter, given that the individual is not punished. The probabilities, p and q, however, are not equal, and. therefore. simple dominance in payoffs does not resolve the problem.
Because U(-c) < 0 and U<gi > 0. if pis close to unity. so that (I -p) 
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Becker writes as follows:
It is easily shown that an increase in pi would reduce the expected utility [of committing the crime], and thus the number of offenses, more than an equal percentage increase in fj if [individual j] has a preference for risk; the increase infj would have the greater effect if he has a\·ersion to risk: and they would have the same effect if he is risk neutral. The widespread generalization that of fenders are more deterred by the probability of convic tion than by the punishment when convicted turns out to imply in the expected-utility approach that offenders are risk preferrers. at least in the relevant region of punish ments. (Becker. 1968: 178) Becker recently reiterated this \'iew:
I believe that criminals actually like risk-they're risk takers. not avoiders. What supports this belief? The economic approach implies that. for a risk taker engaged in crime. the certainty of punishment is more important than the magnitude of the punishment when or if you are convicted. (Becker, 1995: I 1) The comparison of equal percentage changes in p and f in the model employed here produces somewhat more so phisticated results. It is easy to show that an increase in pre duces the expected utility of crime by more than an equal percentage change inf only if the rnlue off is already rea sonably high. More specifically. for an individual with the S-shaped utility function facing the crime decision problem with c = 0. an increase in p has a greater deterrent effect than an equal percentage change inf only iff > ft where ft is determined by the equation Uc g -fi)] is tangent to the utility function at [g -fi,U(g -/ 1). l The widespread generalization that increasing p has a greater deterrent effect than increasing f implies in the ex pected utility approach, extended and refined via the S-shaped utility function. that most potential offenders face crime de cision problems where the le\'el of punishment is already high (i.e., probiems wheref > J;J.
9. Yu and Liska (1993) pro\'ide a sample (from 26 U.S. cities) that suggests that this perception by African Ameri cans is, for assaults and rapes. well supported. They note that ·'blacks contribute 76'ic of the robbery arrests and 76% of the robberies; 65% of the assault arrests and 50% of the assaults; and 73% of the rape arrests and 55% of the rapes" ! Yu and Liska, 1993:455-6 . footnote 9). Hagedorn and Ma con (1988) and Jankowski (1991) report anecdotal evidence that minority individuals in gangs perceive themselves to be harassed by the police.
